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Korea, Europe and the Case of Dasan (Jeong Yak-yong, 
1762–1836)1 
Jana S. ROŠKER* 
Abstract 
Though the Confucian system of thought, society, and government has a long history in 
Korea, Chinese Confucian scholars, preoccupied with the urgency of “saving the 
Confucian essence” used only Japan as a reference in Asia. Therefore, the present article 
aims to introduce Dasan 茶山 (Jeong Yak-yong 정약용, 1762–1836), who was one of the 
main representatives of Korean Confucian philosophy. It exposes his significance for the 
full-range understanding of the landscape of this important traditional East Asian stream of 
thought as well as for the intellectual syntheses between Confucian teachings and the 
Christian religion. The author analyses Dasan’s thought from the Sinological perspective 
and exposes several elements which represent an elaboration and an upgrading of 
traditional Chinese Neo-Confucian philosophy. 
Keywords: Korean Confucianism, Dasan, the School of Practical Learning, silhak, sangje 
Izvleček 
Ne glede na dejstvo, da ima konfucijanski idejni, družbeni in politični sistem v Koreji že 
dolgo zgodovino, so kitajski konfucijanski teoretiki v svojih prizadevanjih za »reševanje 
esence konfucijanstva« kot azijsko referenco običajno upoštevali zgolj Japonsko. Zato 
namerava pričujoči članek predstaviti Dasana 茶山  (Jeong Yak-yonga 정약용, 1762–
1836), ki sodi h glavnim predstavnikom korejske konfucijanske filozofije. Izpostavlja 
njegov pomen za celovitejše razumevanje širokega spektra te pomembne vzhodnoazijske 
idejne struje in za vzpostavljanje miselnih sintez med konfucijanskimi nauki in krščansko 
religijo. Avtorica analizira Dasanovo miselnost iz sinološke perspektive in v njej izpostavi 
vrsto elementov, ki predstavljajo nadgradnjo tradicionalne kitajske neokonfucijanske 
filozofije. 
Ključne besede: korejski konfucianizem, Dasan, Šola praktičnega učenja, silhak, sangje 
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Introduction 
Although Confucianism originated in China, where it formed the crucial state 
doctrine for almost two millenniums, Confucian culture is not only limited to the 
Chinese world, but rather represents a cultural heritage that is commonly shared in 
the entire East Asian region, including Korea, where Neo-Confucianism was 
established as the state ideology during the Joseon period (1392–1897). However, 
unfortunately, in the Chinese project of responding to the challenge of the West, 
Korea has been almost absent for several decades. Until recently, Chinese scholars 
who were dealing with the Confucian revival hardly paid any attention to the 
Korean experience. 
The revitalization of the complex traditions of Confucian philosophical 
thought has assumed increasing relevance and significance in recent decades. In 
the first half of the 20
th
 century, this tendency could be observed in the works of 
many of the leading modern Chinese philosophers (Tu 2010, 13) who were 
searching for ways to renew the methodological and theoretical aspects of the 
Chinese tradition, and especially of the pre-modern philosophy, which followed 
the Neo-Confucian revival. 
Such aims are grounded in the conviction that traditional Confucianism, 
understood as a specifically East Asian social, political and moral system of 
thought can, if renewed and adapted to meet the conditions of the modern era, 
serve as the foundation for an ethically meaningful modern life, while also 
providing a spiritual antidote to the alienation which became increasingly visible 
as a collateral effect of the capitalistic glorification of competition and the single-
minded pursuit of profit.  
The revitalization of the Confucian tradition remains one of the most important 
theoretical currents in contemporary East Asian theory. Due to its potentially 
stabilizing social function and its harmonious compatibility with capitalism, many 
scholars
2
 see it as the Asian equivalent of Max Weber’s “protestant ethic”. In 
modern Sinology, this view is known as the “post-Confucian hypothesis”:    
Indeed, many scholars have invoked Confucianism as an important cultural 
cause of East Asia’s economic success. In particular, scholars such as Berger 
and Tu have gone so far as to propose what is called the post-Confucian thesis, 
i.e.: that Confucianism has not only facilitated economic development in East 
Asian countries, but also has enabled these countries to create a different kind 
                                                 
2 For example, see Feng Yaoming 1992, 227; Wang Hui 2000, 40. 
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of capitalism and take a different path to modernity than the West (Kwon 
2007, 55). 
Hence, it is by no means coincidental that issues connected to the Confucian 
revival belong to the most important tasks in contemporary research in the field of 
classical Chinese philosophy. However, when dealing with these issues, it 
becomes increasingly clear that Confucian culture is not only limited to the 
Chinese world, but also represents a cultural heritage that is commonly shared in 
the entire East Asian region. Thus, it is easily understandable that numerous 
modern Confucians have repeatedly exposed the importance of studying and 
researching the multifarious elaborations and developments of Confucian 
philosophy and ethics deriving from other East Asian regions, as for instance 
Japan and Korea. In his article entitled Korean Confucianism from a Sinic 
perspective, Tu Weiming points out: 
I propose that a dialogue among civilizations focusing on the core values is 
necessary for human survival and flourishing in Confucian East Asia. The 
philosophical enterprise to identify the “universal ethic” must be broadened 
by thick descriptions of paths of learning to be human in the Confucian 
cultural sphere. The danger of shared vulnerability as well as the hope of 
shared aspiration impels us to move beyond unilateralism in order to work 
toward a dialogical civilization. (Tu 2010, 13) 
In this context, we can mention another modern Chinese scholar, Lee Hong-jung, 
who describes the potential of the Confucian tradition in terms of its constitutive 
role within the concept of so-called “Asian values”: 
Characteristic Asian values were transmuted into state-led economic models, 
playing a significant role in the economic development of Asian countries. 
Familism promoted strong cooperation among blood relatives, and created 
small- and mid-size family businesses based on Confucian familism and 
family ethics. These family businesses gradually developed to become the 
framework of Asian capitalism. Community spirit is also a key Asian value. 
By maintaining strong ties based on community spirit and solidarity, Asian 
populations have contributed to the economic development of the region. 
Promoting education, the most important Asian value, also stems from 
Confucianism which teaches that it is better to educate one’s children than to 
give them wealth. This tenet has helped pave the way to economic 
development. The emphasis on education has also raised management 
capabilities and technological expertise, and has facilitated economic 
development through improved productivity (Lee Hong-jung, 2003, 32). 
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However, as already mentioned, in the East Asian project of responding to the 
challenge of the West, in the Chinese and, to a certain degree, in the Japanese 
scholarship as well, Korea has been more or less absent. Until know, Chinese 
Confucian scholars, preoccupied with the urgency of “saving the Confucian 
essence” only used Japan as a reference in Asia. They hardly paid any attention to 
the Korean experience (Tu 2010, 13). The first generation of the Confucian revival 
since the May Fourth Movement (1919–1949) does not seem to consider Korea 
relevant to their concerted effort to learn science and democracy from the West. In 
the second generation (1949–1979), Wing-tsit Chan studied Yi T’oegye’s 
interpretation of Zhu Xi’s thought. His primary purpose was to judge the adequacy 
of Yi’s understanding of Master Zhu. Tang Junyi was intrigued by the so-called 
“two schools” of Zhu Xi in the Korean Confucian tradition, but he was not 
motivated to study the phenomenon. Qian Mu also made reference to Korean 
Confucianism, but generally it was quite superficial. 
I will try to illustrate my point by introducing some aspects of Jeong Yak-
yong’s Neo-Confucian philosophy. Each requires focused investigation. Together, 
they should present a persuasive argument for taking Korean Confucianism 
absolutely seriously for East Asian, especially Chinese, Confucian scholars. It 
should become obvious that an informed appreciation of Confucianism in Korea 
will enrich the self-understanding of East Asian Confucianism and, more 
pertinently to the present discussion, be essential for comprehending the full-range 
of the landscape of Chinese Confucianism. 
The present article explores traditional Korean Confucian thought from a Sinic 
perspective, i.e. through analyses and critical evaluations of its Chinese and/or 
Sinological interpretations.  
Historical and Methodological Background 
The Confucian system of thought, society, and government has a long history in 
Korea. Many think that since the fourteenth century, Confucianism and Korea 
were so closely intertwined that Korean history could not be understood without 
Confucianism while the study of Confucianism itself can be substantially enriched 
by resort to its Korean experience.  
According to most researchers, knowledge of some of Confucian teachings can 
be traced in the earliest days of our real knowledge of the peninsula. The country 
has a long history as a civilized and literate land, with the first dynasty starting 
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about 57 BC. In the early years, Confucianism existed side-by-side with other 
religions and ways of life. For many centuries, its influence on Korea was 
continuous but not pervasive. With the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, however, 
its influence on government and society began to be decisive and, especially from 
the sixteenth century on, it dominated almost completely the thought and 
philosophy of the peninsula, continuing to do so until the opening of the present 
century. In the present article, however, we will not focus upon the historical, 
social and political connotations of Confucian teachings in Korea, but rather 
examine and introduce its philosophical dimensions. 
Neo-Confucian philosophy can be regarded as the discourse, which had the 
most profound influence upon traditional Korean thought (Yoo 2013, 181). Neo-
Confucianism originated in China with Han Yu (768–824) and Li Ao (772–841) in 
the Tang Dynasty, and Zhu Xi (1130–1200) in the Song Dynasty became one of its 
most famous exponents. Neo-Confucians were important because they began to 
provide rational grounds for the standards established by ancient Confucian 
philosophers and to explain why they should be followed. According to Yoo 
Weon-ki (2013, 182), Korean Neo-Confucians in the sixteenth century in the 
Chosön Dynasty became even more precise and careful about supplying rational 
and systematic grounds for their claims. Good examples of such writing methods 
can be found in the so- called Four-Seven Debate between Ki Tae-sùng (高峯
Kobong, 1527–1572) and Yi Hwang ( 李滉 , T’oegye, 1501–1570). Their 
arguments were profound and based upon rational and logical grounds. However, 
most Korean Neo-Confucians do not seem to be interested in taking a logical 
approach to Neo-Confucian discourses. Instead, they tend to remain focused upon 
summarizing and interpreting the crucial ideas and viewpoints of the past (i.e. 
mostly Chinese) Neo-Confucian philosophers without critically analyzing, or 
evaluating their positions. Besides, they were not very interested in judging the 
validity of the arguments. Probably the reason for such writing methods lies in the 
fact that they were not familiar with such methods providing consistency, validity, 
and conceptual clarification. (Yoo 2013, 191) In the fields of metaphysics, socio-
political philosophy and cosmology, however, Korean Neo-Confucian 
philosophers have contributed a lot to the world philosophy by exposing many 
aspects which are topical and most relevant even for the present day philosophy. 
Here, we could mention the Korean Neo-Confucian scholar Yi Yulgok (李珥
1536–1584) who believed that the universe could not be completely 
comprehended by human intelligence or through human thought processes alone. 
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Yulgok believed that the universe is a “mystery” which can and should not be 
reduced to the rational or conceptual framework of human cognitive system. His 
work is doubtless a rich resource for inspiration in recognizing and rediscovering 
the cosmological dimension of Korean Neo-Confucianism, for he developed an 
eco-cosmology, which emphasized the inter-relationship of men and the universe 
(Ro 2012, 122). This new eco-cosmology can be regarded as a basis for 
understanding ecological issues from the cosmological perspective. 
Along with the abovementioned scholars, Dasan
3
 (Jeong Yak-yong, 1762–
1836) is usually listed among the greatest Confucian philosophers in all Korean 
history. In the following, I will try––through a critical analysis of Chinese 
Confucian interpretations of his work––to introduce, summarize and evaluate his 
main contributions to the development of intercultural dimensions of 
Confucianism. 
Dasan (Jeong Yak-yong, 1762–1836): His Life and Work 
Jeong Yak-yong (1762–1836), more widely known under his pen-name Dasan (茶
山 ) is regarded in South Korea today as one of pre-modern Korea’s best 
philosophers. His mains works are dealing with explorations of Neo-Confucian 
themes. He is considered as one of the greatest thinkers of the later Joseon period, 
for he wrote highly influential books on philosophy, science and theories of 
government. He was also famous for his poetry. Dasan’s philosophical position is 
mostly identified with the Silhak (practical learning, 實學) school. As we shall see, 
he also delivered important contributions in the field of intercultural syntheses, 
namely between the Neo-Confucian and the Christian thought. 
During his lifetime, he held significant administrative positions and was even a 
close confident of King Jeongjo who ruled in the period from 1776 till 1800. This 
close relation has begun in 1784, when the king was deeply impressed by the 
objectivity and intelligence of Dasan’s replies to a set of questions he had 
formulated. One year before, Dasan has already passed the chinsagwa (literary 
licentiate examination), which allowed him to enter the Seonggyungwan (成均館 
National Confucian academy). In 1788, Dasan took top place in the daegwa 
(higher civil service exam) and was offered a position in the Office of Royal 
Decrees. However, because he belonged to the progressive ‘Southerner fraction’ 
                                                 
3 In different transcriptions, his name is also spelled Tasan. 
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(Namin) of Korean Confucianism, he was seen as an enemy by the members of the 
opposing “Old Doctrine fraction”. The conflict between them has developed into 
royal intrigues, which led to Dasan’s expulsion; as a result, he was forced to spend 
eighteen years (from 1801 till 1818) in exile in Gangjin, a town in the South Jeolla 
province. His opponents have grounded their accusations on his “revolutionary 
Western influences”, for he was allegedly not only researching and spreading the 
thoughts and methods of Practical Learning (which was introduced to China from 
Europe)
4
, but also some ideas of Roman Catholicism itself. This presumption was 
not merely based on his philosophical thoughts, but also on the fact that his elder 
brother was openly Catholic.  
Although Dasan was probably never baptized, he also showed a positive 
attitude toward the Western religious system. His ideas were doubtless influenced 
by this system, for otherwise it would be hard to explain why God and the spirits 
occupy an important position in his classical writings. In this context, however, is 
worth noting that Dasan’s understanding of Western learning was still mainly 
based on the re-interpretation of the Chinese Neo-Confucianism; it was not 
grounded upon a form of faith that could bring the Western institutional factors 
such as church into the Confucian society of that time (Cawley 2012, 30). By 
understanding and absorption of such learnings, Dasan obviously tried to 
systemize Confucian thought. These methodological efforts have led to the 
establishment of a new theoretical reference framework and have thus played a 
very important role in the further development of Confucian philosophy in Korea.  
Hence, it is not coincidental that Dasan is still considered by Koreans as a 
cross-cultural philosopher, and that his work is serving as an example of how 
Koreans can borrow from the West while nonetheless remaining authentically 
Korean (Baker 2013, 41). 
Dasan has namely modified traditional Korean Confucian moral philosophy to 
include notions of human nature and desires rather than innate virtue, the 
importance of free will rather than mere determination, and the existence of a 
Sangje (上帝, Highest Lord) as a necessary incentive to proper behavior (Baker 
2013, 41). Though he supported these changes to traditional Korean Confucian 
                                                 
4 However, the relationship of the School of Practical Learning (silhak, 實學) to Neo- Confucianism 
is also still subject to many theoretical controversies. Problems concerning the question whether it 
was “imported” from Europe and thus arose in opposition to Neo-Confucianism, or whether it should 
instead be seen as simply one variety of Neo-Confucianism, are still being debated. 
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philosophy with references to the Classics and his own personal moral experience, 
observers have noticed the possibility of Western influence on his thinking. In this 
context, it is important to note that although Dasan was as a Confucian scholar, his 
thinking largely also reflected certain characteristics of the Western thought 
(Baker 2013, 41). These foundations are mainly reflected in his critical theoretical 
re-interpretations of Confucianism, for he managed to incorporate in its 
frameworks some crucial new concepts, which will be more detailed explored and 
introduced bellow. 
Metaphysical and Ethical Approaches 
In order to understand the common threat of Dasan’s philosophy, it seems 
necessary to provide a basic approach to his abovementioned understanding of 
Sangje (Highest Lord) as the ultimate reality (Chung 2006, 254). In the following, 
we will thus examine the Dasan’s theoretical background and his transformation of 
the Confucian system through his concept of Sangje, because his approach is of 
utmost significance to the elaborations of the original Neo-Confucian concept of 
ultimate reality (taiji 太極). 
According to Dasan, Sangje governs all beings––nature, deities and men––
with providence, transcending them at the same time. Sometimes, it is also called 
“Heaven” (Gun 1994, 5) 
The conceptualization of Sangje was very close to the Western concept of a 
monotheistic God; Dasan stated explicitly that there was only one Sangje, not two, 
for he was so noble that he had no counterpart (Dasan in Gun 1994, 14). This 
theological idea was probably stimulated by his encounter with Catholicism in his 
youth. Unlike to the classical Chinese Neo-Confucian philosophers, who 
thoroughly followed Mengzi’s philosophy of innate goodness, Dasan did not 
believe humans were instinctively virtuous. Since as a result, we cannot even trust 
our minds to always tell us the right way to behave. To solve this moral dilemma, 
Dasan came up with an untraditional answer, grounded in his untraditional reading 
of the Confucian Classics (Baker 2013, 49). He believes that we need to be 
“shamed into doing the right thing” (Baker 2013, 49), for the only way we can be 
sure that we will be ashamed every time we do something wrong is if we keep in 
mind that, always and everywhere, we are being watched to see if we think and act 
properly. “Who can possibly watch us always and everywhere? There is only one 
Asian Studies II (XVIII), 2 (2014), pp.111–125 
 
119 
 
possible answer: the Lord Above, whom he called by the ancient Confucian name 
Sangje 上帝.” (Baker 2013, 49)  
But Dasan’s Sangje also possessed an ontological dimension (Dasan 1974, 34). 
Dasan has namely regarded all natural phenomena as products of two potentials 
that could be compared to spiritual and material substances. They represented the 
ontological basis of human beings. According to Gun Yoo Tae (1994, 16) these 
two substances which ultimately follow Sangje’s providence, can be seen as 
forming dual metaphysics, for in Dasan’s thought they represented two origins of 
existence. The origin of these two substances of which the phenomenal world is 
composed was Sangje. Thus, in theoretical terms, many scholars (see Gun 1994, 
16) define Dasan’s metaphysics as a theological dualism, for this Korean Neo-
Confucian philosopher saw the phenomenal world as being composed of two 
(material and spiritual) substances, whereas the ultimate reason of existence was 
represented by Sangje, the only God and the object of religious faith. 
Some other scholars, as for instance Li Fenggui (2005, 183) expose that Dasan 
neglected the importance of the spiritual essence i (理) which has been seen by 
Zhu Xi as the primary ontological element. He emphasized the leading role of the 
material substance ki (氣) which he also equated with the concept of ultimate 
reality (太極). Thus, his onto-metaphysical system cannot be equated with the 
idealistic dualism. On the other hand, he also acknowledged the primary role of 
spirit, for his Sangje in the role of the Supreme Being was seen as the ultimate 
origin or source of existence; thus, scholars advocating the position, according to 
which Dasan’s system is not dualistic, expose that his metaphysics cannot be 
regarded as a philosophy based on material dualism.  
In my own opinion, Dasan’s system can be regarded as a form of idealistic 
(theological) dualism. In his view, the primary role of matter is namely only 
referring to the phenomenal world (Dasan 1974, 23); ultimately, both contrasting 
poles (substances of i and ki) are unified in the pure spiritual realm of Sangje, 
forming a trinity which can in conceptual sense be compared with the theory 
underlying the Christian faith. 
The two substances in question originally appeared in the Chinese Neo-
Confucianism of the Song and Ming Dynasties (li 理 and qi 氣). In Chinese Neo-
Confucianism, however, they appeared as a binary category, in which both anti-
poles functioned in a complementary relation (see Zhu Xi 2000, 13–34). Hence, 
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their unification in a comprehensive, all-embracing entity of a Supreme Being like 
Sangje and the formation of a trinity represents an innovative element in the Neo-
Confucian philosophy.   
However, Dasan’s Sangje was not a creator of the universe (Baker 2013, 53). 
There is also no heaven or hell in his theism. In essence, his Sangje was still a kind 
of Confucian (i.e. rather pragmatically conditioned) ultimate reality and his 
morality was thus a form of Confucian morality
5
. In the methodological or stylistic 
sense, his arguments were also essentially Confucian, for he remained within the 
tradition of philosophizing by writing commentaries on the Confucian Classics.  
Nevertheless, his argument for the existence of his Confucian God required 
him to break with his Confucian tradition on several key philosophical issues, 
starting with the role of li in the cosmos and the definition of human nature 
(Baker 2013, 54). 
As we have seen, Dasan’s specific and original synthesis between Western and 
Neo-Confucian thought becomes most clear in his ethical theories. Similar to the 
majority of other Confucian philosophers, for Dasan, the most urgent concrete 
problems were moral problems, especially those regarding the question how to 
cultivate the ability to act appropriately in every situation. This becomes clearly 
visible in his treatments of the ethical function of emotion in his annotations of 
Confucian classics. Defining human nature as “preference” (Baker 2010, 58), 
Dasan argued that the specific content of nature is to “like good and dislike bad.” 
Verifying the existence of such nature based on his own psychological experiences 
and the existing canon of literature, he attempted to prove the presence and 
universality of moral emotions, especially in ordinary dialogue, relying on 
psychological responses to specific events and the notion of human nature (Baker 
2013, 47). He exposed that emotions had to be properly adjusted (Dasan 1974, 19), 
because identical emotions could lead to contrasting actions, depending on 
                                                 
5 However, we have to take into account several aspects, which cannot be treated in detail in the 
limited scope of this article. We must not forget, for instance, that the so-called Confucian morality 
was (or is) by no means a monolithic formation. Since Chinese philosophy follows the ontological 
model of immanent transcendence, moral postulates possessed innate qualities in the framework of 
traditional Chinese Confucianism. In other words, the Chinese Confucian morality was something 
that had to be actively incorporated into the individual moral Self (daode xingti 道德性體) through 
moral cultivation (xiu shen 修身). Hence, in classical Confucianism, this moral Self assumed the role 
of the ultimate spiritual substance (which was also endowed with morality). Since the notion of 
moral Self was obviously either overlooked or neglected by Dasan, it was only an external 
metaphysical force that could assume the function of an ultimate arbitrary substance governing over 
and judging individual behavior.  
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whether or not they tended to “achieve harmony in moderation”. In this regard, 
Dasan stressed the importance of sincerity and proposed that people, as sincere 
actors, exert every effort for religious cultivation by serving the abovementioned 
Sangje (Highest Lord, 上帝). Hence, Dasan’s theory on emotions offers a basis for 
empirically elaborating the fundamental problems regarding the problematic 
popularization of Confucian philosophical ethics, thus, it represents one of the rare 
contributions to the elaboration of a synthesis between the Neo-Confucian and the 
Christian thought. Besides, his notion of emotions has significance in shifting 
philosophical concerns from the metaphysical sphere to the everyday lived world. 
Political Thought and Practical Learning 
In Korea, the importation of Neo-Confucian thought brought about profound 
changes in the religious, philosophical, and social climate of the Koryo kingdom 
(918–1392) during the time of its decline, forming the foundation for the creation 
of a new sociopolitical and cultural order under the Choso Dynasty (1392–1910, 
see Chung 2006, 253). Thus, it is not coincidental that besides his metaphysical 
and moral theories, Dasan’s perhaps most important contribution to the 
development of pre-modern East Asian thought can be found in his political 
philosophy, which was based on elaborations of the Neo-Confucian ethics. 
According to Zhu Xi, individuals are transformed into moral beings through the 
cultivation of their character, and the increase of moral individuals therefore leads 
to the generation of a moral society. While acknowledging that moral success 
through such cultivation produces moral heroes, Dasan Jeong Yak-yong argued 
that inner cultivation alone could not produce moral individuals and a moral 
society because in reality humans have a myriad of conflicting desires and 
fluctuating volitions. Without confining morality to the purification of inner mind, 
Dasan considered both inner reflection and external practice grounded on free will 
to be necessary. Through both, he believed, individuals attain a personal sense of 
responsibility and preside over the entire process of morality. Although in reality 
there are personal differences, people can partake proactively in the construction 
of a moral society. In this regard, Dasan is credited with shifting the focus of 
Confucianism from the sage and his inner reflection to common people and 
practice. For him, Confucian politics should be understood as a horizontal 
relationship between the ruler and the people as captured in the idea of 
“accompanying people” (與民), rather than a hierarchical one as in the “bestowing 
of privilege to the people” (爲民) (Chang 2014, 10).  
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As explained in the previous section, Dasan placed great emphasis on Sangje 
in the sense of the Supreme Being controlling and regulating human behavior and 
forcing men to act in accordance with moral virtues. He agreed, however, that 
morality was defined in terms of human interactions, rather than interactions with 
supernatural beings (Baker 2010, 56).  
In his exegesis of the term “perfect goodness” in the Great Learning, Tasan 
argued that “perfect goodness” referred to appropriate interactions between 
human beings. For Tasan, just as for the Confucians who preceded him, it was 
significant that a key term which we translate today as morality, illyun, is 
composed of two Sino-Korean characters which mean “people” and 
“relationships” respectively. Therefore he could not conceive of morality apart 
from human relationships. (Baker 2010, 56) 
This communitarian aspect is connected to the fact that Dasan was one of the most 
prominent adherents and creators of the Korean Confucian School of practical 
learning (silhak, shixue 實學).  
This term is usually applied in the sense of a new trend in thought that, 
stimulated by worsening contradictions in Korean society in the 18
th
 century, 
focused on concrete social reality rather than abstract philosophical issues and 
sought to promote reform and therefore it can be said to have a modern and a 
nationalistic orientation. 
According to most scholars, Silhak was designed to counter the “uncritical” 
following of Confucian teachings and the strict adherence to “formalism” and 
“ritual” by neo-Confucians. Most of the Silhak scholars were from fractions 
excluded from power and other disaffected scholars calling for reform. They 
advocated an empirical Confucianism deeply concerned with human society at the 
practical level. Its proponents generally argued for reforming the rigid Confucian 
social structure, land reforms to relieve the plight of peasant farmers, promoting 
Korea's own national identity and culture, encouraging the study of science, and 
advocating technology exchange with foreign countries. Silhak scholars wanted to 
use realistic and experimental approaches to social problems with the 
consideration of the welfare of the people. Silhak scholars encouraged human 
equality and moved toward a more Korean view of Korean history. The Silhak 
School is thus––well deservedly––credited with helping to create a modern Korea. 
Dasan is regarded as one of the most important representative of the Korean 
Silhak school. As we have seen in the previous sections, he followed a very 
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concrete, down-to-earth concept of ethics, which he shared with his fellow 
Confucians. However, he went on to apply his preference for the specific and 
concrete to some of the more abstract Confucian virtues.  
Dasan rejected the notion that human beings should cultivate an abstract 
reverence for the unity of the cosmos, or some other hard-to-visualize concept. 
Nor did he agree with mainstream Neo-Confucians that reverence referred to 
a general state of mind of the sort we translate today as mindfulness. Instead, 
he insisted reverence was only true reverence if it was reverence for a specific 
object. (Baker 2010, 57) 
It was precisely this insistence on a specific object of reverence that has led him to 
his abovementioned belief in a supernatural personality who corresponds to the 
Western concept of God.  
Scholars who write about Dasan as a silhak scholar, i.e. as a realistic and 
practical thinker, usually refer to his writings on government administration or on 
land redistribution. However, as Don Baker (2010, 61) points out, even if we take 
into account only his ethical philosophy, we have grounds for calling him a Silhak 
thinker. His realistic moral psychology, his concrete ethical prescriptions, and his 
pragmatic theology alone are enough to justify awarding him the proud label of 
such a scholar. 
Therefore, Dasan’s political thought which is not only rooted in Confucian 
philosophy, but also in the theories of Practical Learning, represents an important 
development of most egalitarian approaches that can be found in the classical 
Confucian philosophy. Hence, Dasan’s thought is also of utmost significance as a 
theoretical basis for a possible future process of Confucian modernization and 
democratization. 
Conclusion 
Notwithstanding his “Western” orientation, this eighteenth-century Korean 
Confucian scholar played an important role in the history of the making of East 
Asian Confucianisms. He created new intellectual trends that helped East Asian 
Confucians criticize, break through, and think beyond the scope of Zhu Xi’s 
learning. Regarding classical Neo-Confucian doctrines, we can say that in some 
aspects, Dasan more or less followed their main positions. However, in other 
respects he certainly developed something innovative and new. Dasan was also 
well versed in the Confucian thought of the Japanese Classical School, which he 
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also criticized while constructing his own system of thought. Thus, he was 
certainly an innovative philosopher who tried to compose syntheses from several 
different streams of thought. From a Sinological perspective, the most interesting 
aspect of his philosophy is certainly to be found in his methodological conception 
of trinity composed from the two bipolar substances i and ki which are seen as 
forming the phenomenal world, but are simultaneously transcended by the ultimate 
source of all existence, the transcendental, monotheist Highest Lord (or Supreme 
Being), namely Sangje.  
This metaphysical basis has also been reflected by and incorporated into his 
ethical and political thought. In these two scopes of his work, one can observe a 
great influence of the Silhak School (or the School of Practical Learning, 實學). 
Considering all these innovations and the progressive nature of his basic 
intellectual orientation, it becomes quite clear that Dasan creatively remolded the 
old to shape the new in the making of Korean and East Asian Confucianisms. Thus, 
his work is not only significant for a coherent and more comprehensive evaluation 
of traditional Korean philosophy, but also for developing and investigating new 
intercultural aspects of Neo-Confucian thought systems. 
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